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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
ADJOINING LANDOWNERS-LATERAL SUPPORT.-Defendant was sued for injuries to plaintiff's dwelling on an adjoining lot caused by defendant's having
-excavated on his lot after having given plaintiff notice of the intended excavation. Held, defendant, after having given plaintiff reasonable notice of
the intended excavation, was not liable for injuries to plaintiff's building
-which resulted from defendant's "ordinarily careful excavation of his own
lot." Vandegrift, et al. v. Boward (Md. 1916), 98 Atl. 528.
In the absence of statute it is well settled that a landowner who in excavating on his land injures a building on adjoining land is liable only if
the injury has resulted from his negligence. Pullan v. Stall111a1i, 76 N. J. L.
10, 56 Atl. n6; Simon v. Nance, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 48o, 100 S. W. 1038. What
.a landowner intending to excavate on his land need do to protect himself
from liability may not always be readily determined. The Maryland Supreme Court has held: (I), that notice of the proposed excavation is
necessary, and that, after having given notice, the excavator must exercise
"'due care and skill, at his peril, to prevent injury to the adjoining land-owner." Shafer v. Wilson, 44 Md. 268; (2), that failure to give notice is
not necessarily fatal, and if notice is given there is no liability if the
·excavation is made with reasonable and ordinary care. Bonaparte v. Wiseman, 8g Md. 12, 42 Atl. 918, 44 L. R. A. 482; (3), that if notice has been
_given there is liability only for "actual and positive negligence in the manner
.of doing the work," and the excavator need not use "the same care that a
·prudent man would exercise in similar circumstances." Serio v. Murphy,
.et al, 99 iMd. 545, 58 Atl. 435, 105 Am. St. Rep. 316; and (4), that the duty
of a landowner whose property is liable to be injured, after having been
-notified, is merely to protect his property against an inevitable injury which
might otherwise result from the most careful performance of the excavation.
Hanrahan v. Baltimore City, II4 Md. 517, 8o Atl. 312. It would seem a
-task of no little difficulty to reconcile all of these pronouncements. A late
Michigan case has made "reasonable precautions" necessary, the jury to
-determine what was reasonable. Bissell v. Ford, 176 Mich. 64, quoting
-Gildersleeve v. Hammond, 109 Mich. 431, 67 N. W. 519, 33 !.;. R. A. 46. A
North Carolina case makes notice of the extent of the excavation necessary.
Davis v. Sm11merfield, l3I N. C. 352.
BANKRUPTCY-SUSPENSION OF STATE LAWS.-A farmer appealed from an
·order declaring him insolvent and appointing a trustee to manage and
dispose of his estate as provided by the state insolvency law. Held, that
·Congress by expressly exempting farmers from involuntary bankruptcy
(§ 4b), to the extent of that exemption intended not to suspend the state
:insolvency laws. Pitcher v. Standish, (Conn. 1916), g8 Atl. 93.
There is no doubt that to the extent the state and national acts cover the
.same field. the former is suspended. Ketchum v. McNamara, 72 Conn. 709,
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7II, 46 At!. 146, 50 L. R. A. 641; Sturgis v. Crow11inshield, 4 Wheat. 122;
Harbaugh v. Costello, 184 Ill. 110, 113, 56 N. E. 363, 75 Am. St. Rep. 147.
But the decisions are in hopeless conflict as to the effect of excepting
farmers from the operation of § 4b of the Bankruptcy Act, some holding
that Congress intended to cover 'the whole field of his insolvent condition;
Parmalee Mfg. Co. v. Hamilto1i, 172 Mass. 178, 180, 51 N. E. 529 (dictum);
Littlefield v. Gay, g6 l\Ie. 422, 52 Atl. 925; Jn. re Weedma1i Stave Co., 199
Fed. 948, 29 A. B. R. 460, others that its intention was "to leave the matter
untouched, and therefore subject to the regulation of the states." Old Town
Bank v. McCormick, g6 Md. 341, 352, 53 At!. 934 6o L. R. A. 577, 94 Am.
St. Rep. 577; Lace v. Smith, 34 R. I. 1, 12, 82 Atl. 268, Ann. Cas. 1913, E. 945.
The latter view, adopted in the instant case, is the weight of authority, following the statement of Justice MARSHALL in Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4
Wheat. 122, that it is not the existence but the exercise of the power to
establish a genuine bankruptcy law in conflict with state laws, which
renders the latter inoperative. The courts agree that the express exclusion
of all corporations but "manufacturing, trading, printing, etc.," from the
operation of both § § 4a and 4b of the National Act does not as to them
suspend the state laws. Herron Co. v. Superior Court, I36 Cal. 279, 282, 6S
Pac. 8I4; Dille v. People, n8 Ill. App. 426. Hence as to this class Congress
is said to have exercised its power. The court argues from this premise
that Con.gress had no different intention as to farmers when providing that
they could become voluntary bankrupts. The answer that "Congress intended to create a complete system of bankruptcy, and when it made
certain exceptions it did so because it seemed wise that in such cases bankruptcy should not be permitted at all" (29 HARV. L. Rsv. 776) is too broad,
if the decisions are correct as to the effect of expressly excepting certain
classes of corporations from the operation of § 4. See generally I I MICH.
L. Rsv. 6o; 22 HARV. L. REv. 776; REMINGTON, § § I62g.30.
BANKRUPTCY-WHEN IS RECORDING REQU!RJ>D.-A mortgage given more
than four months before bankruptcy was recorded within four months prior
to the petition. The state statute required recording as against subsequent
purchasers and lien creditors. Held, it was required to be recorded within
the meaning of § 6oa of the bankruptcy act so as to be voidable by the
trustee under § 6ob, all other elements of a voidable preference as defined
by § 6oa being present at the time of recording. Bunch v. M alo11ey, 233
Fed. 967 (C. C. A. 1916).
The District Court in the instant case, 225 Fed. 243, (prior 1o Carey v.
Do110/iue, 240 U. S. 430, 36 Sup. Ct. 386)., followed the previous rulings of
the sixth, seventh and eighth circuits that a trustee may set aside a transfer
recorded within the four months' period if recording is required as to anyone.
Carey v. Donohue held that "the trustee could not under § 6ob avail himself
of a requirement exclusively in the interest of someone outside of the bankruptcy act [subsequent purchasers] and for whom he was not authorized to
speak,'' but Justice HUGHES, in giving the opinion of the court, said that
recording is "required" under § 6o if it is required "for the protection of
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.creditors-the persons interested in the bankrupt estate, and in whose behalf, or in whose place the trustee is entitled to act" The Circuit Court
·Of Appeals in the instant case followed the decision of Carey v. Donohue
and also affirmed the holding of the District ·Court, that when recording is
necessary as against lien creditors, one of the classes represented by the
·trustee, (BANKRUPTCY Acr, .§ 47a), there is a "requirement" under § 6oa.
Though the case does not actually decide that recording is "required" und·er
·§ 6o if it is required as against "a judgment creditor holding an execution
-duly returned unsatisfied" or a general creditor, the other classes represented by the trustees, nevertheless, since no local statute is likely to require
recording against such creditors without also requiring it against a lien
.creditor, practically the holding is that "if recording is required as against
any of the classes referred to in § 47a (2), there is a "requirement" under
-§ 60. Justice HuGHES, in Carey v. Donohue, though citing Meser Drng Co.
v. Pipkiii Drng Co. (C. C. A. Fifth), I36 Ft:d. 3g6, as reaching a "<liffer.ent conclusion" from that reached in the sixth, seventh and eighth circuits,
which he overrules, cannot be said thereby to sanction the rule laid down by
the fifth circuit that "whether and to what extent a chattel mortgage given
before but recorded within the four months' period is valid against a
·trustee, must be determined exclusively by the state law." (Remington §
1383). The statute in that case is identical with the instant one and the
decision, if it followed the dictum in Carey v. Do11-0lme or the holding in
the instant case, would: be reversed. On this point generally, see 14 MICH.
L. REv. 578.
BILLS AND NOTES-PROVISION FOR ATTORNJ;y's FESS-NO'!.' CONCLUSIVE AS TO
AMOUNT.-A stipulation in a note for 10% attorney's fees is not conclusive
:as to the amount due for such services. In an action at law upon the note
the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee is a jury question. Farmer's and
.Mechanic's Bank of Florence v. Whitehead, (S. C. 19I6), 8g S. E. 657.
As to the validity of such stipulations in a note for attorney's fees the
,courts are in irreconcilable conflict. The apparent weight of authority holds
them to be valid and enforceable. Dorsey v. J:-Vollf, I42 Ill. 589; Jones v.
Radatz, 27 Minn. 240; First National Bank v. Larson, 6o Wis. 206; Stanley
·v. Farmers Bank, I7 Kan. 592; Bowie v. Hall, 69 Md. 433. But in many
jurisdictions such stipulations are void by statute: (Hartford Security Co. v.
Eyer, 36 Neb. - ; Clmrchman v. Martin, 54 Ind. 38o); as an evasion of the
·usury laws, (Boozer v. Anderson, 42 Ark. I67; Meyer v. Hart, 40 Mich. 5I7);
:as against public policy as a penalty or forfeiture, (Witherspoon v. Musselman, I4 Bush (Ky.) 214; Bullock v. Ta~,ilor, 39 Mich. I37; Bank v. Pate et,
74-W. Va. 5n, 82 S. E. 332; Rixey v. Pearre, 8g Va. n3); as tending to
.encourage litigation and oppress the debtor, (Tinsley v. Hoskins, III N. C.
_340). That such a stipulation does not affect the negotiability of the in:-strument is now definitely settled by the Negotiable Instruments Law. See
12 MICH. L. R:i;v., 225. As to whether the amount stated: in the stipulation is
.conclusive of the amount that may be recovered for attorneys' fees in suit
'1!pon the note, in those states •which do hold that such provision is valid and
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-enforceable, there are three well defined lines of authority. (1) The amount
.or per cent stated is conclusive; such is a provision for liquidated damages
and the holder need only aver the stipulation, the note itself being all the
evidence required to support judgment for that amount. Bank of Dallas
v. T11ttle, 5 New Mex. 427, 23 Pac. 241, 7 L. R. A. 445; Bank v. Ga::,o, n4 Mo.
203, 21 S. W. 479; Bank of Vicksb11rg v. Mayer, 129 La. 981, 57 So. 3o8.
(2) The amount or per cent stated is not conclusive and· only a reasonable
amount can be recovered. The stipulation amounts to a contract for in·demnity and (a) the plaintiff must allege and prove the contract price of
his attorney's fees, or in absence of a contract, a reasonable price. Reed
-v. Taylor, (Texas, r9IO) 129 S. W. 864; Camp, Glover & Co. v. Randle &
Co., 81 Ala. 240, 2 So. 287; Bank v. Wood, 125 Tenn. 6, 140 S. W. 31; Nat'l
Bank v. Coleman, 204 Fed. 24. (b) The plaintiff need not aver or prove
the amount of such fees actually contracted for or paid in order to recover
the amount stated in note, but the defendant in mitigation of damages may
show they were less. Kennedy v. Richardson, 70 Ind. 524; Stephenson v.
Allison, 123 Ala. 439, 26 So. 290; Florence Oil Refining Co. v. Hiawatha
Oil Co., 55 Colo. 378, 135 Pac. 454; Ba11k v. Robinson, I04 Tex. 166, 135 S.
W. 372; Utah Nat'l Bank v. Nelson, 38 Utah 16g, 111 Pac. 907; Keena1i v.
Blue, 240 Ill. 177, 88 N. E. 553. Oregon holds provisions for "reasonable
:attorney's fees" valid and will enforce them on proof by plaintiff (Peyser v.
Cole, I I Ore. 39, 4 Pac. 520) but refuses to allow any recovery where the
stipulation is for a stated amount or per cent on the ground that such had
grown into an oppressive abuse. (Levins v. Briggs, 21 Ore. 333, 28 Pac. 15).
The weight of authority and better reason would seem to be with the principal case, in holding such to be an agreement to indemnify the holder.
Where the stipulation is for a stated amount or per cent, and such is held
.conclusive of the amount recovered, regardless of the actual fees of the
·plaintiff, it leads to oppression of the debtor and partakes more of the nature
of a penalty than of liquidated d'amages. Campbell v. Warman, 58 Minn.
,561 ; Tinsley v. Hoskins, 111 N. C. 340.
BILLS AND NoTSS-Rl;QUISITES oF A QUALIFISD lNDORSEMENT.-Payee wrote
.-on back of a negotiable promissory note the words, "I transfer my right,
title, and interest in same. J. 1M. B." Held, in suit on the note, that such
is not a qualified indorsement and the payee is liable thereon as an ordinary
indorser. Copeland v. Burke, (Okla. 1916), 158 Pac. 1162.
The words "I hereby transfer my interest in this note to - - , J. W. B."
·were indorsed upon the back of a promissory note. Held, that this '\Vas such
;an indorsement as to render indorser liable in a suit in the same action
with the maker. Hurt v. Wiley tGa. App. 1916), 89 S. E. 494It does not appear that the phraseology of the Negotiable Instruments Law
as to qualified indorsements introduces any new rule on the subject. The
holding of the above cases is sustained by the numerical weight of authority
:on the ground that in order for an indorser of a negotiable instrument to
limit his personal liability thereon he must do so in words clearly expressing
:bis intent. Markey v. Corey, lo8 Mich. 184, 66 N. W. 493, 36 L. R. A. 117,
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62 Am. St. Rep. 698; Sears v. La11tz, 47 Iowa 658; Sans v. Woods, l Iowa 262;
Maine Trust a11d Banking Co. v. Butler, 45 Minn. 5o6, 48 N. W. 333, 12 L. R
A. 370. It is argued that since the mere signature of the indorser on the
back of the instrument gh-es to the subsequent rightful holder authority to
enter a full indorsement in his own name, the signature with the added words
of assignment can have no less effect and that it is obvious that by merely
writing out on the back of the paper just what would have been inferred by
the law from the signature in blank, the indorser would incur neither greater
nor less liability. See Davidson v. Powell, II4 N. C. 575, 19 S. E. 601; Richards v. Frankum, 9 Car. & P. 221; Adams v. Blethen, 66 Me. 19, 22 Am. Rep.
547; Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Walton, 96 Va. 435, 31 S. E. 890; Marks v. Herma1m, 24 La. Ann. 335; Shelby v. lttdd, 24 Kan. l6I ; Steve11s v. Hanan, 86
Mich. 305; Lelmhart v. Ramey, 3 Ohio Cir. Ct. 135, 2 0. C. D. 77; L<!aky v.
Hawarth, 141 Fed. 850; D1dfy v. O'Co1mer, 66 Tenn. 498; l'DANJF.r,s, NtGo'.l'.
INSTR. §" 688c. This reasoning seems fallacious. The ordinary indorsemcnt
of a promissory note involves two express contracts: one-the sale or assignment-completely executed; the otlier-that of future but conditional liability
-wholly executory. Having stated in express words one of the two implications of the ordinary general indorsement or indorsement in blank, the
plain intention of the indorser would seem to be to exclude the other, and tqbe bound as assignor only. All the words of a written contract are to be
given some force and not to be regarded as merely nugatory, and these words
would seem to show that the indorser was not content with the obligations
the law raises upon his bare signature. A different construction subjects him
to liabilities he did not intend to undertake. Spencer v. Halpern, 62 Ark. 595,
36 L. R A. 120; Aniba v. Yeomans, 39 Mich. 171; Hailey v. Falconer, 32 Ala.
536; Lyons v. Dibilbis, 22 Penn. 185; Ellsworth v. Varney, 83 Ill. App. 92;
Gale v. Mayhew, 161 Mich. g6, 125 N. W. 781; Briggs v. Latham, 36 Kan. 205;;
TlED:EMAN, COM. p APF,R, § 265.
CARRIERS--MlSDELI\Tl(RY AND CoNv:ERSION ·OF Goons.-Defendant, a common
carrier, received goods from plaintiff for transportation to B Company. With
the shipment defendant delivered to B Company an "expense bill" erroneously
describing one M as the consignor. Relying thereon, B Company paid M for
the goods so shipped. Plaintiff sued defendant carrier, claiming conversion,
and recovered judgment in District Court, which was reversed by the Supreme
Court on appeal. Cohen v. Mpls., St. P. ,c;. S. S. M. Ry. Co. (Minn. 1916),
158 N. W. 334These facts present the converse of the usual case, to which this was likened by the trial court, of delivery by a carrier to the wrong consignee. It isa familiar principle that such misdelivery is a conversion even though it be
the result of an innocent mistake, which the carrier offers to rectify. See
ANN. CAs. 1915 D, 871, and note, for discussion and authorities. But the
principal case is unique in the contention of plaintiff, upheld in the trial court,
that, although delivery was made to the proper consignee, the carrier was
guilty of a conversion in that it transported and delivered the goods shipped'
by plaintiff "as the goods of M,'' which "amounted to the same thing as a·
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delivery to the wrong consignee." Regardless of other aspects of the case,
it seems clear that the essential element of conversion, viz., an exercise of
dominion over goods to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the right of
the true owner (COOL£Y, TORTS (3rd Ed.) 859; Fouldes v. Willoughby, 8 :M.
& W. 540) is not pre.sent, since immediately upon delivery to it the carrier
held the goods as the agent and bailee of the consignee, who at that time
became the true owner (35 Cvc. 193; United Slates v. R. P. A11drcws & Co..
207 U. S. 229, 240; Kessler v. Smith, 42 Minn. 494; Schr..rff v. Meyer, 133 :.\fo.
428, 54 Am. St. Rep. 672, and note) ; and at no time subsequent to his delivery of the goods to defendant did the plaintiff have such a title or right as
would entitle him to sue for conversion (COOLEY, TORTS (3rd Ed.) 848; I.iptrot v. Holmes, l Kelly 381; Locke v. Schreck, 54 Neb. 472, 74 N. Vf. 970).
CARR1£RS-NOTICE OF CLAU.[ TO CONNECTING CARRIER-CARMACK AMENDMENT.-Plaintiff shipped cattle via defendant's railroad and a connecting line.
A stipulation in the bill of lading provided that the shipper, as a condition
precedent to his right to recover for loss or injury in transit, should give
notice in writing of his claim to some officer or agent "of said company" before the cattle were .removed from the place of destination or mingled with
other stock. Plaintiff failed to give such notice, hut the Montana c:ourt held
that the requiremeµt was unreasonable. and void, because there was no agent
of defendant company available at the destination upon whom such notice
could be served. On writ of error to the United States Supreme Court, the
judgment was re,·ersed on the ground that notice mi~ht validly have been
given to the connecting carrier, and that the stipulation was therefore reasonable. Northern Pacific RailwaJ• Co. v. Wall, 36 Sup. Ct. 493.
Before the CARMACK A:tlf£NDMENT (34 Stat. at l,. 584, Ch. 3591; Comp.
Stat. 1913, § 8592) there was a diversity of legislation and decisions as to
the validity of stipulations in bills of lading requiring notice of claim to be
presented within a limited time. Such provisions, in the absence of statute,
were usually held valid if reasonable; but there was variety of judicial opinion as to what constituted reasonableness. Stipulations similar to that in
the principal case, in terms requiring notice of claim to be given to the initial
carrier, were held unreasonable and void by some courts (Coles v. Louisville,
E. & St. L. R. Co., 41 Ill. App. 6o7; Engcsether v. Great Northern. Ry. Co.,
65 Minn. 168, 68 N. W. 4; Smitha v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 86 Tenn. lg8,
6 S. W. 209; Good v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 4 L. R. A. 8o1, II S. W.
854; Ho11ston & T. C. R. Co. v. Davis, II Tex. Civ. App. 24, 31 S. W. 3o8)
and by others illegal and void on statutory or constitutional grounds (Ohio
& M. Ry. Co. v. Tabor, 98 Ky. 503, 36 S. W. 18; Grieve v. Ill. Ce11t. R. Co.,
104 Ia. 659, 74 N. W. 192). Some cases unhe!d such stipulations, though apparently considering that notice to the connecting carrier would not be sufficient (Selby v. Wilmington & W.R. Co., II3 N. C. 588. 18 S. E. 88, 37 Am.
St. Rep. 635; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Scrivener, 2 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App.
330); and a few decisions, on the same reasoning as the principal -case, held
such provisions reasonable and valid on the ground that the connecting carrier was the agent of the initial carrier and that notice to it was sufficient
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(Wichita & W. Ry. Co. v. Koch, 47 Kan. 753). See generally Baldwin 'v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., (Iowa 1916), L. R. A. 1916 D, 3j5, ahd note.
'fhe=''eARM:ACK AMENDMF.NT, by virtue of the broad interpretation it received ·at the hands of the Supreme Court in Adams Exp. Co. v. Crim=inger, 226 U. S. 491, 44 L. R. A. N. S. 257, and other cases immediately
following, superseded and abrogated all state laws on the subject insofar
as they affected interstate commerce, and since that amendment a stipulation requiring notice of claim to be given or suit to be brought within
a limited time is valid even though (as in the principal case) such a stipulation is declared void by a state statute (Mo. K. & T. R. R. Co.
Harriman, 227 U. S. 657). The CuMMINS AMENDMENT of 1915 (38 Stat.
at L. ng6) expressly recognizes th~ validity of such provisions, and provides a minimum time of ninety days within which notice of claim may be
required. The doctrine of Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 34
Sup. Ct.· 526 is applicable to regulations of this nature, and the burden is on
the shipper to prove that the schedules of rates and regulations was not properly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission (Cincinnati, N. 0. & T.
P. R. Co. v. Rankin, 36 Sup. Ct. 555). The provisions of the contract of
transportation cannot be waived; but, on the other hand, a very slight performance on the part of the shipper is held to be notice and a compliance with the
stipulation-as, a telegram (Georgia, F. & A. R. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 36
Sup. Ct. 541). Prior to the CARMACK AMENDMF:NT, also, it had been decided
that in cases of shipments over several connecting lines each carrier was the
agent of the others if there was a "through contract" (Afo. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Twiss, 35 Neb. 267; Southern Pac. Co. v. Dimcan, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 94), but
there was a diversity of authority as to what constituted a through contract,
some courts holding that the mere acceptance of goods directed to a point
not on the line of the receiving carrier was prima facie a through contract
(Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 Ill. 88), others that an express agreement for through transportation was necessary (Myrick v. Mich. Cent. R. R.
Co., 107 U. S. 102, I Sup, Ct. 425). \:Vhere there ·was a through contract,
notice t_o the connecting carrier was considered by some courts notice to all
(Wichita & W. Ry. Co. v. Koch, supra) but not when the shipment was made
on independent contracts (Houston e?' T. C. R. R. Co. v. Mayes, 44 Tex. Civ.
App. 31, 97 S. W. 318). An important effect of the CARMACK AMENDMENT
was to constitute the connecting carrier, in all cases of interstate shipment
over more than one line, the agent of the initial carrier for the purpose of
completing the transportation and delivering the goods (Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 1g6, 2o6, 55 L. Ed. 167, 178, 182, 31
L. R. A. (N. S.) 7, 31 Sup. Ct. 164; Galveston, II. & S. A. R. Co. v. Wallace,
223 U. S. 481, 491, 56 L. Ed. 516, 523, 32 Sup. Ct. 205). In the principal case
this relation is held to extend to make the connecting carrier the agent of
the initial carrier for the purpose of receiving a stipulated notice of claim,
in terms required to be given to the initial carrier. See also Gulf, C. & S. F.
Ry. Co. v. Bogy (Texas 1915); 178 S. W. 577; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. A. l.
Steele- & Son, n7 Va. 788, 86 S. E. 124; Aydlett v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co. (N.
c. Od:. 1916), 88 s. E. IOOO.

v.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LA w-CITY-PLANNING-RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS.-Pursuant
to legislative authority, the city of Minneapolis passed an ordinance establishing a residential district within which no person should thereafter erect
any building except for residence purposes, including duplex and double
houses, and apartment houses, and expressly prohibiting within the district
"the erection and maintenance of hotels, stores, factories, warehouses, dry
cleaning plants, public garages or stables, or any industrial establishment or
any business whatsoever." No provision was made for compensation of
owners of property thus restricted. The relater owned land within the district so established and had, previous to the passage of this ordinance, obtained a permit for the erection of a store building, and had begun building
operations thereon. After the passage of the ordinance, he was refused a
permit for electric wiring in the building upon the ground that the erection
of the building was prohibited by the ordinance. Iield, that mandamus should
issue to the Building Inspector to compel the issuance of the wiring permit.
State e% rel. Lachtma1i v. Houghton (Minn. 1916), 158 N. W. rn17.
Ignoring the po!isibility of excepting this case from the operation of the
ordinance, the court rests its decision solely upon the unconstitutionality of
the statute under which the ordinance was passed. It is said: "The Legislature has power to regulate and restrict the manner in which the owner may
make use of his property so far as may be necessary for the general welfare;
but such regulations and restrictions must tend in some degree to prevent
harm to the public or to promote the common good, and must not unreasonably impair or abridge his property rights. * *·* To promote the general wellbeing, cities may als'o prescribe districts within which no business or occupation of a noxious or offensive character, or which tends to interfere with the
comfort and prosperity of others, may he carried on. The dividing line between restrictions which may he lawfully imposed under the police power
and those which invade the rights secured to the property owner by the constitutional provisions that his property shall not be taken or damaged without
compensation, nor he be deprived of it without due process of law, has never
been distinctly marked out, and probably cannot be. As different cases arise,
the courts determine from the facts and circumstances of the particular case
whether it falls upon one side or the other of the line." From the case of
People e% rel. v. Cit',!,' of Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, is quoted the doctrine, "There is
nothing inherently dangerous to the health or safety of the public in conducting a retail store. It may be that in certain exclusively residential districts the
owners of residence property would prefer not to have any retail stores in
such blocks; but if such be the case it manifestly arises solely from esthetic
considerations." • From this and from the reliance of the court upon the billboard cases, and upon the cases, "equally U!Janimous that restrictions upon the
use of property cannot be imposed under the police power for purely esthetic
considerations," it becomes clear that the court considered that the ordinance
in question i:ubsen•ed but an esthetic end (except in a few of its particular
applications) and that no such end would justify the taking of property without compensation. HAI.LAM, J., dissenting, shows that there is really very
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little authority against the validity of such legislation, and that there is some
authority for it. The friends of city planning may yet hope.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INVOI,UNTARY SERVI'WDE.-The defendant was convicted under a statute of Iowa (§ 2407 of the Supplemental Supplement to the
Code) which provided that a person who had been once found guilty of contempt for violating a liquor injunction shall, for each subsequent violation
and consequent contempt of court, be punished by imprisonment in the state
penitentiary at hard labor for not more than one year. Upon appeal, the defendant invoked the protection of the provision found both in the state constitution and in the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States prohibiting involuntary servitude except for crimes of which the per·
son has been duly convicted. Held, that the statute in question was unconstitutional. Flannagan v. Jepson (Iowa 1916), 158 N. W. 641.
Is the "punishment provided for in this statute "involuntary servitude" within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment? Justice BREWER defines the
term as "A condition of enforced compulsory service of one to another."
Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 16, 27 Sup. Ct. 8, 51 L. Ed. 65. "Imprisonment at hard labor, compulsory and unpaid, is, in the strongest sense of the
words, 'involuntary servitude'." E~ parte H'ilso11, II4 U. S. 417, 5 Sup. Ct.
935, 29 L. Ed. 8g. And yet there are cases where one has been held to forced
labor and the courts have decided that under the facts no constitutional right
was infringed thereby. A familiar example is the compulsory performance
by sailors of their contracts. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 17 Sup. Ct.
326, 41 L. Ed. 715. The requirement from certain persons of a stipulated
amount of labor on the public highways is held not to be violative of the
Thirteenth Amendment, though such work is in a sense involuntary servitude. Deiinis v. Simon, 51 Ohio St. 233, 36 N. E. 832; Butler v. Perry, 240
U. S. 328, 36 Sup. Ct. 258, 60 I,. Ed. -, commented on in 14 MICH. L. RI>v.
5g8. There are certain services which may be commanded of every citizen by
his government and obedience enforced thereto. Among these services is
training in the militia. fo re Dassler, 35 Kans. 678, 12 Pac. 130. Though the
statement last quoted was not necessary to the decision in the case, who will
insist that the Thirteenth Amendment is violated by compulsory service in
defense of the nation? The apprenticing of children· by parents or by the
state under its tutorial power and compelling them to perform labor proper
to be required according to their ages cannot be said to be violative of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Kennedy v. Meara, et al., 127 Ga. 68, 56 S. E. 243,
9 Ann. Cas. 3g6. The principal case does not come within any of the enumerated exceptions, nor can any reason be alleged why an additional exception
should be made to fit the facts set out above. The court ha~ inherent power
to punish for contempt, and mere imprisonment as a punishment for contempt is violative of no constitutional right. Eilenbecker v. Dist. Ct., 134 U.
S. 31, IO Sup. Ct. 424, 33 L. Ed. 8o1. The Thirteenth Amendment does permit involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime, but this clause has no
bearing upon the constitutionality of the statute in question, as contempt of
court is not a crime. Marlin v. Blattner, 68 Iowa 286, 25 N. W. 131; State
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v. Stevenson, 104 Iowa 50, 73 N. W. 36o. The court, determining that this
statute permitted involuntary servitude for an offense not adjudged a crime,
held it to be in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and therefore unconstitutional. See II MICH. L. RJ;;v. 159.
CONSTITUTION.AI, LAw-Rl;;FERSNDUM AS POLITICAL QuESTION.-Whether or
not a state has ceased to be republican in form within the meaning of the
guaranty of United States Constitution, Article 4, Section 4, because it has
made the referendum a part of the legislative power, is not a judicial question, but a political one, which is solely for Congress to determine. State of
Ohio ez rel. Davis v. Hilderbrant (1916), 36 Sup. Ct 7o8.
It will be noticed that the Constitution does not itself define the term "re:Publican form of government" It has, however, always been an accepted
rule of construction that technical and special terms used in the Constitution
:are to be given that meaning which they had at the time that instrument was
framed. Turning to history contemporary with the framers of the Constitution and recalling their love of liberty and desire for the fullest political free-Oom, is it not probable that the phrase "republican form of government" was
used as a guarantee against any monarchial rule that might threaten a state
rather than as a denial of a free and unhampered democratic form of government? The political philosophy of many of the framers favored a centrifugal
as opposed to a centripetal system and a consequent desire that as much
power should be left in the people as was compatible with a representative
system of government. Judge COOLEY on page 45 of his Constitutional Limitations (7th Edition) states that the purpose of this guarantee is to "protect a Union founded on republican principles, and composed entirely of republican members, against aristocratic and monarchial innovations." But
whether the adoption of the referendum by the citizens destroys the republican form of government in the state is a political question. Pacific States
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. u8, 56 L. Ed. 377, 32 Sup.
Ct 224 Political questions are to be determined by Congress. Luther v.
Borden, 7 How. I, 12 L. Ed. 581; Neely v. Henkel, 18o. U. S. rn9, 45 L. Ed.
448, 21 Sup. Ct. 302; Riverside Co1111ty v. Sati Bernardino County, I34 Cal.
517, 66 Pac. 788; Parker v. State, I33 Ind. 178, 32 N. E. 836, 33 N. E. II9, 18
L. R A. 567. The only difficulty about the question seems to arise from a
-failure to realize that the legislative duty of determining the political questions involved in deciding whether or not a government is republican in form
is entirely different and separate from the judicial power and duty of upholding and enforcing, whenever it becomes necessary in a controversy properly
submitted, the applicable provisions of the Constitution as to each and every
exercise of governmental power.
CoRPORATIONs-CORI'ORATION AS PLAINTIFF IN ACTION FOR LmEL.-X Navigation Co., a corporation, charges in one count that D caused to be published
in a newspaper the statement that X Navigation Co. had unfairly discriminated in freight and passenger rates, a statutory offense punishable by a heavy
fine; and on the second count charges a signed statement by D in a news-
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paper to the effect that X Navigation Co had "robbed the people all these
years." D demurs to both counts. Held, demurrer must be sustained as to
first count, but overmled as to second. Puget Sound Nm•igation Co. v. Carter (D. C. ;916), 233 Fed. 832.
D's contention is that the first statement is not definite enough to be a
direct accusation of a statutory offense, and that, as the corporation could not
possibly be a "robber" and the context of the obnoxious phrase fails to constitute an innuendo which would be defamatory in nature, and as special damage is not alleged in either count, the plaintiff's case fails. The first contention is good, but as to the second the libelous statement describes a course
of business of the Navigation Co., and the meaning of the words is plainly
defamatory, whatever the precise phraseology may be. Such expressions tend
to injure the corporation in its business reputation and credit, and ~uch injuries are the elements of damage in any action for defamation of a corporation. Aaolf Philipp Co. v. New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, 1,50 N. Y. Supp. 1044~
Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 6Q6. Competition is a good
thing and to be encouraged, hut libel, even against a corporation, is a forbidden tool. P. L. Hennessey & Bro. v. Traders' Iimirauce Co., 87 Miss. 259.
If the publication does not tend to injure the business reputation of the corporation, special damage must be alleged and proved. Hc>pkins Chemical Co.
v. Read Drug & Chemical Co., 124 Md. 210. If, as in the present case, the
publication does tend to injure the corporation's business reputation anq
credit, special damage need not be alleged and proved. Daily v. De Y omig,
127 Fed. 491; Bee Publishing Co. v. World Publishing Co., 62 Neb. 732;
Reporters' Association of America v. Sun Publishing Co., 186 N. Y. 437;
Burr's Damascus Tool T¥orks v. Peninsular Tool Mfg. Co., 142 Mich. 417;
Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Cc>., 25 Idaho 6g6. In Kemble & .~fills v.
Kaighn, 131 N. Y. App. Div. 63, it is stated that the law is "definitely settled" in New York that a corporation complainant in action for libel need
neither allege nor prove special damage "where the language used is defamatory in itself and injuriously and directly affects its credit and necessarily
and directly occasions pecuniary injury."
CORPORATIONS - CORPORATION'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS OF CORPORATION
CoNTROLLED BY.IT.-Where the entire stock of A Co. is owned by B Co., 98~%
·of whose stock is owned in tum by C Co., and the directors of all three companies are practically the same; held, that B Co. and C Co. are properly
joined with A Co. in a federal prosecution under the Clayton Act based on
illegal leases made by A Co., although neither fraud nor conspiracy is alleged. U11ited States v. United Shoe M achillery Co. (D. C. 1916), 234 Fed.
127.
"Courts, and especially courts of equity, will look beyond the corporate
action, and if it clearly appears that one corporation is merely a creature of
another, the latter holding all the stock of the former, thereby controlling it
as effectively as it does itself, it will be treated as the practical owner of the
coiporation when necessary for the purpose of doing justice." This quotation from the opinion gives an excellent, if somewhat liberal, statement oi
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"the rule generally accepted. It will be noted too that the decision, 011 the
facts, goes farther than a strict interpretation of the rule would justify. The
·frequently quoted statement that it takes a "strong case" for a court to make
-one corporation liable for the acts of another is illustrated in most of the
cases, but seems to be less strikingly true when the public interest is subserved
by holding the controlling corporation liable. Thus Van Dresser v. Oregon
Ry. & Navigation Co., 48 Fed. 202 contrasted with United Press v. A. S.
Abell Co., 68 N. Y. Supp. 6!3. Interesting late cases on this point are Pitts.burgh & Buffalo Co. v. Duucan, 232 Fed. 584; Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power Co. (Minn.), I58 N. W. 979; Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v.
Boatmen's Bank, 234 Fed. 4I, and the many cases cited in the main case and
:in CooK, CORPORATIONS, §§ 3I7, 663, 664, & 727. Miner v. Husted (Mich.), I57
N. W. 442, 23 D. J.,. N. 243, is an extremely broad application of the rule to a
'(;aSe between private parties.
COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND-NECESSITY FOR NAMING ASSIGNS.Action against the assignee of the reversion in premises leased by plaintiff.
The covenant, in which assignees were not mentioned, provided for payment·
by the lessor for improvements made in promotion of the "purposes for which
the lease stipulated the premises were to be used. Held, the covenant of the
1essor ran with the reversion, and was enforceable against his assignee. Pur-vis v. Shaman (Ill. I9I6), n2 N. E. 679.
·
In Spencer's Case, 2 Coke I7, it was resolved that where a covenant in a
1ease concerns a thing not in esse it will in no case run to bind the assignees
.of the covenanting parties unless "named." This doctrine is still supported
by the numerical weight of authori!)'. Thompson v. Rose, 8 Cow. 266; Bream
'V. Dickerson, 2 Humph. I26; Cronin v. Watkins, I Tenn. Ch. II9; Walsh v•.
Fussell, 6 Bing. I63; Gre:>• v. Cuthberson, 2 Chit. 482; Etowah Mili. Co. v.
Wills Valley Co., IZI Ala. 672, 25 So. 720; Tallman v. Coffin, 4 N. Y. 134;
Watson v. Gardner, II9 Ill. 3I2, IO N. E. 192. In llfinsclmll v. Oakes, 2 H .
.& N. 793, which was a covenant to repair any building that might be erected,
the doctrine of Spencer's Case, supra, was limited to covenants to do "an
-absolutely new thing." It would seem that the decision in the principal case
might be supported by like reasoning, but it was not put on this ground. Grey
v. Cuthberson, supra, decided manY, years before Minschull v. Oakes, supra,
involved a covenant to pay for fruit trees which might be planted, and the
distinction was not made. Another group of cases shows a tendency, which
is becoming more general, to depart from what is frequently considered the
technical, if not arbitrary, rule of Spencer's Case, a11d hold that the covenant
runs, if from the instrument it can be determined that the parties intended
·that it should, regardless of whether the assignees are "named," Masury v. ·
Soutltwortlt, 9 Oh. St. 34I; Brockmeyer, v. Sanitary District, u8 Ill. App. 49;
Duffy v. Southern Pac. R'J•., 36 Ore. 128; Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co. v.
BoS1,1Jorth, 46 Oh. St. 81; Sc:ra11cr v. Wilson, I36 Ia. 357, I4 L. R A. (N. S.)
185. The opinion in the principal case evinces a more tender regard for Spe11.cer's Case, supra, than is shown in those just cited; but in closing the court
:states: ''Whether there was ever any rational ground of distinction between
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things which are or are not in esse when the covenant is made where they do
not concern the use and enjoyment of the demised premises, there certainly
is none where the covenant directly concerns such use and enjoyment" The
second resolution in Spencer's Case assumes in each instance that the covenant "directly concerns" the thing demised, and the presence of that fact in
the principal case only goes to supply that ever-present requisite, and does not
at all touch the necessity of "naming" the assignees, which is directly governed by whether the covenant concerns a thing in esse. If there is an option
on the part of the tenant to improve, the covenant to pay for such improvement is considered personal, and wili not nm. Hite v. Parks, 2 Tenn. Ch.
373; Cicalla v. Miller, 105 Tenn. 255; Gardner v. Samuel, n6 Calif. S.t. 47
Pac. 935; Batchelder v. Dean, 16 N. H. 265. The court succeeded in finding
in the language used, a covenant on the part of the lessee to improve.
CRIMINAL LAW-INTENT TO COMMIT ARORTION.-Defendant was convicted
of the crime of abortion. The judge of the lower court charged the jury
that "an intent to produce a miscarriage may exist without absolute knowledge of pregnancy. And if there be a mere suspicion that pregnancy exists,
there may be an intent to cause a miscarriage if the suspected condition
exists." Held, the charge as to the existence of the intent along with mere
suspicion of pregnancy was correct State v. Loomis (N. J.), 97 At!. 8¢.
Courts have generally agreed that intent on the part of the accused to commit an abortion is an essential element of the crime. State v. Jones, 4 Pennewill 109, 53 At!. 858; State v. Gaul (Wash.), 152 Pac. 1029. It has also been
held as in the principal case that intent to commit an abortion may be present
without knowledge or even strong belief that the woman is pregnant State
v. Powe, 48 N. J. Law 34- "Intention does not necessarily involve expectation. I may intend a result which I well know to be extremely improbable.
So an act may be intentional with respect to a particular circumstance, although the chance of the existence of that circumstance is known to be exceedingly small. Intention is the foresight of a desired issue, however improbable-not the foresight of an undesired issue, however probable. If I fire
a rifle in the direction of a man half a mile away, I may lmow perfectly well
that the chance of hitting him is not one in a thousand; I may fully expect
to miss him; nevertheless, I intend to hit him if I desire to do so. He who
steals a letter containing a cheque intentionally steals the cheque also, if he
hopes that the letter will contain one, even though he well knows the odds
against the existence of such a circumstance are very great. Conversely, expectation does not in itself amount to intention. An operating surgeon may
know very well that the patient will probably die of the operation; yet he
does not intend the fatal consequence which he expects. He intends the recovery which he hopes for but does not expect" Salmond on Jurisprudence
(4th ed.) 336. For an analogous problem see 14 MICH. L. Rsv. 399.
DAMAGES-EVIDENCE OF INDUSTRIOUS HABITS AnMISSIBLE.-Plaintiff sued
for damages based on injuries sustained through defendant's fault He became unconscious, continued in that state for several days and suffered from
permanent !liminution of hearing, recurring headaches and dizziness. The
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lower court permitted plaintiff to prove his industrious habits. Held, the
evidence was properly admitted to aid the jury in determining plaintiff's earning power and the amount of damages. Pot·sytlz \'. fVallace et al. (Wash.
1916), 159 Pac. 696.
The court declined to exclude the proof under either the reasoning or the
rule in Davis v. Kan1man, 141 Ala. 479, 37 South. 789, or in Pennsylvania R.
Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. 339, 98 Am. Dec. 229. These cases refused to allow
evidence of industrious habits on the ground that it would prejudice ·the jury
and lead to unjust damages. They are supported by Louisville & Nashville
R. Co. v. Woods, II5 Ala. 527, 22 South. 33. The principal case follows the
doctrine laid down in Lo11i.<;7.1i/le & Nashville R. Cc•. v. Daniel, 122 Ky. 256,
91 S. W. 691, 28 Ky. Law Rep. IJ46, 3 L. R A. (N. S.) n90; Metropolitmi
St. Ry. Co. v. Ke1111ed31, 82 Fed. 158, 2i C. C. A. 136; Camero1i Mill etc., Co.
v. Anderson, 98 Tex. 156, 81 S. W. 282, l L. R A. (N. S.) 198. In these
cases the view is taken that industrious habits are a part of a man's earning
power and evidence of such habits is admissible as bearing upon the damages
sustained. This rule is apparently in accordance \vith the weight of authority,
and has been followed in Texas Mexican Ry. Co. v. Douglas, 73 Tex. 325;
Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Cowser, 57 Tex. 293. It is well settled that it is'
material to show the industrious habits of deceased as bearing upon what he
might have earned for those entitled to bis estate, when injury results in
death. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Perkerson, n2 Ga. 923, 38 S. E. 365, 53
L. R A. 210; Cc11tral Railroad v. Thompson, 76 Ga. 770; Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co. v. Wightman's Admr., 29 Grat. (Va.) 431, 26 Am. Rep. 384; lnter11atio11al & G. N. Ry. Co. v. McNeel, (Tex. Civ. App. 1895), 29 S. W. u33;
David v. Southwestern R. Co., 41 Ga. 223; Burton v. 1.Vilmington &· TV. R.
Co., 82 N. C. 505; Chicago v. Sholten, 78 Ill. 472; Do11aldson v. The Miss. &
Mo. R. Co., 18 Ia. 28o; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Butler, 57 Pa. 335; Kesle1· v.
Smith, 66 N. C. 154- There seems to be no valid reason why habits of industry should not be considered to enable the jury to determine pecuniary lo~s
sustained by injuries not resulting in death.
DIV0Rcr:-AL1MoNY.-The husband had dissipated nearly alt of a considerable property inherited by him. The wife sued for divorce and alimony.
Held, that an award of the greater part of the husband's property, real and
personal, for support of the wife and her three small children was not excessive. Snay v. Snay (Mich. 1916), 158 N. W. 858.
The amount of the alimony rests in the sound discretion of the court and
many things are considered in measuring it, such as: the husband's health,
age, earning capacity, future prospects and probable acquisition of wealth
from any source, the amount of property owned by him and the amount
owned by his wife. The amount of the alimony depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case. Hooper v. Hooper, 102 Wis. 5g8; Bialy v. Bialy,
167 Mich. 559. The weight of authority is opposed to awarding specific property except when authorized by statute as in Michigan. Calame v. Calame,
25 N. J. Eq. 548; Brenger v. Bre11ger, 142 Wis. 26. Some courts hold that
there need be no such statutory authority to award real estate as alimony.
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Berthelemy v. Johnson, 3 B. Mon. 90; M11ir v. Muir, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 1355. A
court rarely awards so large a part of the husband's property as in tht! principal case. Most case~ hold that an award of one-half of the husband's property is excessive. Judge Coou:v so holds in Hamilton v. Hamilton, 37 Mich.
603. On facts much like those in Snay v. Snay, supra, the court held in Ross
v. Ross, 78 Ill. 402 that an award of all the husband's property was excessive.
DIVORCE-MA'tRIMONIAL DoMICIL.-Plaintiff, whose original domicil was in
Louisiana, at the age of eighteen entered West Point and later the United
States Army, continuing in that service thirty-one years. During this time he
was married to defendant in Brooklyn and resided there with her for twelve
years; she refused to follow him to Oregon, (where he was sent by military
order) and he, having returned to Louisiana to resi~e, brought suit for divorce on the ground of desertion. Held, that he never lost his domicil in
Louisian'a and that the court had jurisdiction. Stevens v. Allen (La. 1916),
71 So. 936.
The case is interesting because the statute of Louisiana defint!s abandonment as a withdrawing from the "common dwelling." and prior Louisiana decisions (Heath v. id., 42 La. Ann. 437; Muller v. Hilton, 13 La. Ann. 1) have
intimated that such "common dwelling" must have been in Louisiana. In the
principal case the marriage was in New York, the desertion took place there,
defendant is residing there, and has never been in Louisiana. Therefore the
court deemed it important to establish the fact that at the time of the desertion the matrimonial domidil was in Louisiana. The court comes to that conclusion by the following steps: (1) A married woman has no other domicil
than that of her husband (Birmingham v. O'Neil, n6 La. 1085; Strouse v.
Leipf, IOI Ala. 433) ; unless through his fault she acquires a separate domicil (Wilcox v. Nixon, us La. 47; King v. King, 122 La. 582). (2) Unless
otherwise provided by law a domicil of origin is retained until another is acquired (First National Bank v. Hinton, 123 La. 1025; Borland v. Boston,
132 Mass. 8g). (3) Domicil is not forfeited by absence on busint!ss of the
state or of the United States (Bank ·of Phoeb:ts v. ~yrum, no Va. 708;
Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill: 158). (4) If the wife refuses unjustifiably
to follow the husband it would amount to desertion on her part and give
jurisdiction to the courts of the state to which the husband removed. The
principal case seems at first blush to be identical with Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U. S. 567, in regard to its facts. In that case Haddock was domiciled in
New York, and was married there; he abandoned bis wife there, and went
to Connecticut, where he acquired a domicil. He secured a divorce from her
without personal service of proress in that state, on the ground of desertion.
Later the- wife in New York sued Haddock for divorce and he set 'up the
Connecticut decree in defense. It was beld to be not binding on the New
York court on the ground that the matrimonial domicil continued in New
York and never was in Connecticut; so Connecticut did not have jurisdiction
over the entire res. The principal case differs, of course, in the fact that the
husband's original (a~d, as he claimed, sole) domicil was in the state where
he seeks his divorce.
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ExF.cU'.rION-AUTOMOBILF; NoT Ex:i::MI'T AS "WAGON."-Replevin to obtain
-:automobile taken under execution against physician whose only vehicle was
:the machine in question. Held, the automobile was properly taken under ex-ecution, not being included in exemptions mentioned in Shannon's Code
(§ 3794) providing that there shall be exempt from execution, seizure, or
attachment, " * * * one, two, or one one-horse wagon and harness * * *."
Prater v. Riechman (Tenn.), 187 S. W. 305.
In reviewing the case the court said, "The public policy underlying our ex-emption statutes for heads of families is that a creditor should be restrained
from having satisfaction of his debt out of certain kinds of property which
:are necessary to the maintenance of the families of improvident or unfortu-,
nate debtors." The court, professing to follow this doctrine, decided that an
automobile is property so dissimilar in kind from any of the articles named
in the statute, that it cannot be held to be embraced therein, unless the court
should depart from legitimate construction and engage in judicial legislation.
In reaching that conclusion, the court stated,-"The automobile is a product
-of a civilization advanced much beyond the date of our exemption statute.;
:and it is, as a means of transportation, a different class of vehicle altogether
from those named in our statute." This strict construction of the statute is
very generally opposed by other courts holding that an automobile serves the
purpose of a wagon or other vehicle, and under a statute making a carriage
exempt, an automobile is a carriage within the meaning of the statute. Lames
v. Armstrong, 163 Iowa 327, 144 N. W. I, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 6g1; ParkP"T v.
Sweet (Texas), 127 S. W. 881; Trenton v. Towan, 44 N. J. Eq. 702, 70 Atl.
6o6; Peevehouse v. ·Smith (Texas), 152 S. W. u96; Hammo:id v. Pickett
(Texas), 158 S. W. 174; Patten v. Sturgeon, 214 Fed. 65. It has been held
that a physician's vehicle and harness reasonably nece"5Sary for the practice
-of his profession are exempt from execution. Richards v. Hubbard, 59 N.
H. 158, 47 Am. Rep. 188; Eastman v. Caswell, 8 How. Prac. 75; Van Bu1·e11
v. Lope, 29 Barb. 388. Also, that the only vehicle owned by the defendant in
·execution is exempt. Nichqls v. Claiborne, 39 Texas 363. Even "a bicycle,
babitually used by a painter, paperhanger, and billposter to earn a Jiving, he
being the head of the family, is exempt, though such vehicles were not known
when the statute was enacted." Roberts v. Parker, II/ Iowa 38g, 90 N. W.
744- As opposed to the general attitude taken by the Tennessee court, the
better view, upheld by the authorities generally, may be expressed thus: "The
adaptation and actual use of an article, even if not absolutely necessary to
enable one to carry on his principal business, though he have two kinds of
business, and though his business is not extensive, and does not occupy his
whole time, is sufficient to exempt such article." Ken3•on v. Baker, 16 Mich.
373, 97 Am. Dec. 158. See generally, comment on Patten. v. Sturgeon, supra,
in 13 Mica L. R:i::v. 1s2.
•
MINF.S AND MINlNG-ANTICLINF. AS A:J>F.x GIVING ExTRALATF.RAL RIGHT.-A
mineral-bearing vein passed under the surface of plaintiff's mining claim, sloping up from south to north at an angle varying from I7 to 30 degrees from
the horizontal; it passed ·through the north side-line plane of plaintiff's claim
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into defendant's adjoining claim, continuing its upward course to a point
where it sharply altered its direction and began to slope downward to the
north at an angle of about 17 degrees from the horizontal, thus forming an
anticlinal fold roughly approximating the shape of the roof of a house. At
some points the two sloping members of this fold united in a ridge; at other
places the two members were as much as 20 feet apart This ridge (or, at
points where the two members of the fold did not unite, the highest parts of
the two ~embers) passed through the east end-line plane and the north sideline plane of defendant's claim; defendant, claiming this ridge to be an apex,
has exercised its extralateral right and mined in the southerly member of
the anticlinal fold under the surface of plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff, claiming
that the ridge is not an apex, sues for damages and an injunction. Held, that
the ridge is an apex and that plaintiff, owning the apex, can follow the
vein on its downward course in both directions under the property of other
locators: Jim Butler Tonopah Mining Co. v. West End Consol. Mining Co.
(Nev. 1916), 158 Pac. 876.
§ 2322 of the UNITF.D STATES REVISED STATUTES gives to a mining locator,
whose location includes the top or apex of any vein, the right to follow such
vein on it; downward course outside the vertical side-lines of the location,
but the statute contains no definition of "top or apex," and the terms have
been left to judicial construction. Nearly every definition of the terms has
included a statement that the top or apex must be the highest point of the
vein where it comes to, or nearest to, the surface of the earth "and where it
is broken on the edge, so as to appear to be the beginning or end of the vein."
This language was used by Judge GoDDARD in charging the jury in Iron Silver
Mining Co. v. Louisville, and has been quoted in the leading case of Dttggaii
v. Davey, 4 Dak. no, 26 N. W. 887, and in numerous later cases. See I BARRINGER & ADAMS, MINES & MINING, 44I, 442; CosTIGAN, MINING LAW, 139;
EMERY, MINER'S MANUAL, 72; LINDLEY, MINES (3 ed.),§§ 3o8-9; MoRRISON,
MINING RIGHTS (I4 ed.) 194; SNYDER, MINF.S, § 7g6; and the recent case of
Stewart _'4fining Co. v. 011tario Mining Co., 237 U. S. 350, 35 Sup. Ct. 610, 59'
L. ed. g89. The unanimity of the courts and text-writers in using the term
"edge" in defining "apex" led the plaintiff in the principal case to insist that
there could be no apex without an edge, but the court pointed out that in all of
the cases heretofore decided there had been an edge at the highest point of
the vein, and that the use of the term "edge" was correct as applied in thos.?
cases, but was not necessary to a proper definition under other circumstances.
Mr. LINDL:EY, in his work on MINES (§ 309) makes the categorical statement
that an anticlinal fold cannot be an apex, and as counsel for the plaintiff in
the principal case he strove to maintain that position, but was unable to convince the court that his· position was correct.
NEGLIGENCE-EXPLOSIVES.-The city council of the city of p appointed two
members of the board of Aldermen and four members of the council to act
as a special joint committee to arrange for a Fourth of July celebration. This
committee, without authority, admitted five members of a Business Men's Association to act with them in the matter of the celebration. A special sub-
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committee on fireworks was appointed which made a contract with X Fireworks Company, under which the company took full charge of the fireworks.
display, but was to be under the direct control of the Special Fireworks Committee. An unexploded bomb came down on plaintiff's premises and was.
found by his minor son, who set it off and was seriously injured by the resulting explosion. Plaintiff sued the members of the General CommitteeThe lower court directed a verdict for defendants, but the Supreme Court
held, that the members of the General Committee were personally liable, thequestion of negligence being for the jury. Sroka v. Halliday (1916 R. I.), 97
At!. 965.
It was contended by the defendants in this case and given as reasons by
the lower court in directing a verdict that (I) The members of a committee
appointed under a vote of the city council could not be held liable; (2) thefurnishing and firing of the fireworks was let to contractors, who were independent contractors, and any negligence was that of such independent contractor. However the Supreme Court held that the committee appointed by
the city council had no right to admit citizens designated by the Business.
Men's Association and the council committee together with the other citizens
whom they admitted to have places thereon, were deemed to have acted uporr
their personal responsibility and they and the outside members were suhject
to the same duties and liabilities in respect to one injured by fireworks used"
in the celebration. It is well established that an employer is not responsible
for the negligence of an independent contractor who does all the work freefrom any control or right of control as to details but where the contract callsfor the doing of things which, unless precautions are taken, are liable to doinjury to others, it is the employer's duty to see that such precautions are
taken and he cannot escape such duty by turning over the whole matter tothe contractor. Bia11ki v. Greater American Exposition et al., 3 Neb. (Unof.)
656, 92 N. Vv. 615; l enne v. Sutton, 43 N. J. Law, 257, 39 Am. St. Rep. 578;
La11da1t v. City of New York, 180 N. Y. 48, 72 N. E. 631, 105 Am. St. Rep.
709; Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 218. Upon the question of
negligence the present decision is in accord with most cases involving negligence in the use of fireworks. That it is actionable negligence to leave bombs:
or other explosives in a position where they are liable to be found and exploded by children to their injury, see T·Vells v. Gallagher, 144 Ala. 369, 39·
So. 747, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 759, 113 Am. St. Rep. so; Barnett v. CliffsideMills, 167 N. C. 576, 83 S. E. 326; Pittsbtirg etc. Ry. v. Shields, 47 Ohio St.
390, 24 N. E. 658, 8 L. R A. 464, 21 Am. St. Rep. 840. It is negligence touse dynamite bombs and other explosives which are so improperly manufactured that they will not explode in the air and to fire them into the air·
at such an angle that they will fall upon public or private premises and permit them to remain where children and persons unacquainted with their dan-·
gerous nature can pick them up and cause them to explode to their injuryand damage. Bianki v. Greater American Exposition et al., supra. The above
decision was on facts,very sif1!ilar to those in the principal case. Another
case nearly similar and entirely in accord with those two decisions is Cornwall v. Bloomington Bllsiness Men's Association, 163 III. App. 461.
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SALES-WHAT CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL SAU~ OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
-The prohibition law of the state of (~eorgia makes it unlawful to sell or
barter for a valuable consideration intoxicating liquors. Defendant was in·dicted under this law for exchanging intoxicating liquors for a stolen pair of
shoes. The fact that the shoes had been stolen was unknown to defendant
at the time of the transaction, but he was later compelled to return them to
the rightful owner from whom title had never passed. Held, the exchange
-Of intoxicating liquors for stolen property constituted a violation of the
.statute. Turner v. State (Ga. I9I6), 8g S. E. 538.
The issue in this case is novel. The question, whether or not stolen property is a valuable consideration as required hy a statute prohibiting the sale
-0r barter of intoxicating liquors has apparently never come before the courts
for decision. The contention of defense is not appareut from the case. The
-0nly possible one would seem to be that stolen shoes not being a valuable
conside~tion, the transaction was a gift and not covered by the statute. A
_gift is not within a statute prohibiting the barter and sale of intoxicating
liquors. Wood v. Territory, I Ore. 223; Commonwealth v. Packard, 71 Mass.
(5 Gray) IOI; Finle3• v. State, 47 S. W. 1015. The court stated, "There was
a delivery of the liquor hy Turner to Evans, and a delivery of the shoes by
Evans to Turner, and it would seem that Turner could not be heard to say
i:hat there was no consideration flowing to him in this transaction. He intended making a sale, and the consideration he e~pected to flow to him was
the shoes." This statement would seem to follow the cases holding a barter
-to be a sale within the statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors.
Howard v. Harris, 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 297; Brnce v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 53;
.Commonwealth v. Abrams, 150 Mass. 393. Contra :-Stevenson v. State, 65
Ind. 409; Gillaii v. State, 47 Ark. 555. However, it was unnecessary for the
-decision of this case to decide whether a barter is a sale, as the statute ex-pressly prohibited both a sale and a barter of intoxicating liquors.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-OF ORAr, AGREEMENT To EXECUTE WRITTEN· CoN·TRACT.-The complainant contracted orally to purchase the gasoline extracted
·from the gas controlled by the defendant for five years and it was orally
:agreed that the contract should be reduced to writing. Later the defendant refused to deliver the writing and repudiated the contract. The
-complainant then brought a bill in equity praying that the defendant should
-execute and deliver to the complainant a copy of the contract. The defendant demurred. Held, the demurrer should be sustained and relief denied.
-Clark v. City of Bradford Gas and Power Corp. et al. (Del. 1916), 98 Atl. 368.
This contract is clearly within the Statute of Frauds, being not performable
within the space of a year. It must be noted that the complainant does not
"base his suit upon the principal oral contract, i.e., the one which was to continue for a period of five years, but rather upon the agreement to reduce the
·principal contract to writing. This is a clear attempt to evade the Statute of
Frauds, because the damages for the breach of this oral agreement would be
-the same as for the breach of the principal contract. The complainant could
'tlot recover on this oral agreement in an action at law. McLachlfo v. Village
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of Wlzitelzall, II4 App. Div. 3r5, 99 N. Y. Supp. 72I; Greeii v. Penna. Steel
Co., 75 Md. Io9, 23 At!. r39. Whether a court of equity will give relief by
requiring such an oral agreement to be reduced to writing is the question in
the principal case. The situation is rather an unusual one, but at least two.
cases hold that equitable relief should be denied. M cKbzlr.y v. Lloyd, r28Fed. 5I9; Sarkisian v. Teele, 20I Mass. 607. 'l'he leading case of Glass VHulbert, I02 Mass. 24, 3 Arn. Rep. 4I8, which is partially relied upon by the
court in the principal case and which is also so strongly criticized by Po:r.niROY in 3 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (3rd Ed.) § 867 is clearly distinguishable.
That was a case in which reformation of a written contract is asked for by
parol evidence-there is no attempt to cause an oral agreement to be reduced
to writing. Also, the principal case is not in the category of cases in which:
a party has made fraudulent representations as to the existence of the writing. BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS, § 446. It would be strange if the refusal
to reduce the agreement to writing would be considered fraud; if it were,
every oral agreement to make a written contract could be enforced in equity
and the whole effect of the Statute of Frauds nullified. True, equity has
seemingly rewritten the statute by allowing specific performance of oral land
contracts where there is an independent equity, such as part performance or
the making of an outlay. For refusing to extend this evasion of the statute
by a process of judicial legislation in cases where, as in the priTicipal case,
there is no independent equity, the court is to be commended.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-MUTUALITY OF REMEDY AND ADEQUACY OF LEGAL
REMEDY.-A agreed to sell and B to buy a certain number of shares of corporate stock. A dispute arose and A brought a suit for specific performance.
The stock was not readily obtainable on the market and was admitted to be
of such a nature as to allow B to have specific performance of the contract
in case A should refuse to transfer the stock. Held, that specific performance
should not be granted. G. W. Baker Mach. Co. v. United States Fire Apparatus Co. (Del. I9I6), 97 Atl. 613.
The fact that one party to a contract has the right to specific performance,
does not give the other party the same right in case of breach. Eckstein v.
Downing, 64 N. H. 248, 9 At!. 626, IO Am. St. Rep. 404; Lone Star Salt Co.
v. Texas Short Line Ry. Co., 99 Texas 434, 86 S. W. 362; Hickey v. Dole, 66
N. H. 336, 29 At!. 793; Railway Co. v. Walworth, 193 Pa. 207, 44 At!. 253,
74 Am. St. Rep. 683. The reason for this is not, as is suggested in the principal case, that the powers of the Chancellor are limited by § 3844 of the Code
of Delaware, which provides that equity shall have no jurisdiction where the
remedy at law is adequate. This is not peculiar to Delaware but it is merely
declarative of the general rule of equity. See cases cited above; also for a
criticism of the doctrine of mutuality of remedy, 3 CoL. L. REv. I. The court,
in the principal case, then denies equitable relief on the theory that A's remedy at law is adequate. It is pointed out that after notice to B, A might have
sold the stock at public sale and recovered the difference, however great, in
an action at law. 3 SUTHERLAND, DA11<AGES, § 647. But for that matter, in
case A and not B refused to perform the contrar.t; B might have purchased
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the stock at an exhorbitant price even from A if necessary and have then recovered the difference in an action at law. 3 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGI;s, § 651.
And so if the remedy is admitted to be inadequate in the latter case, it must
be inadequate in the former. It would seem that the court has not a proper
-conception of the term, adequacy of legal remedy. An adequate remedy at
law, which will deprive a court of equity of jurisdiction, is a remedy as cer.tain, complete, prompt and efficient to attain the ends of justice as the rem-edy in equity. Blacksto11e Hall Co. v. Rhode Island Co. (R. I. 1916), 97 Atl.
488; Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 7 I,. Ed. 655; Springfield Milling Co. v.
Barnard & Leas Mfg. Co., 81 Fed. 261, 26 C. C. A. 389; Brow1i v. Arnold,
131 Fed. 723, 67 C. C. A. 125. Under this definition, .it would seem that A's
Temedy at law is inadequate, for considerable delay and risk would be involved in a public sale and suit for the difference, in view of the fact that
the stock is not selling regularly on the market. Generally, where the buy·er's remedy is inadequate, the seller's is also, if this definition be accepted.
The court in the principal case have taken an admirable view upon the ques;tion of mutuality of remedy and one fully in accord with the modem trend
-of authority, although they put it on the ground of their own Code provision.
But as to the meaning of the word inadequacy of legal remedy, it might more
logically have followed the definition of the Federal Courts. In regard to a
seller's rights to demand specific performance of a contract for sale of stock,
see 13 MICH. L. :&Ev. 009.
ToRTS-LIABII.ITY OF T1ttATER FOR IN]URll:s To SrECTATOR.-Plaintiff's wife
was a spectator at defendant's theater, where some trained lions were performing. These lions did not belong to the defendant and he did not have
-direct charge of them, having merely engaged their owner to give this part
-0f the performance. Three lions escaped from their cages and plaintiff's
wife was injured in the panic which followed. Held, that defendant was
1iable for the injuries received in the panic although he did not own or have
<:harge of the lions and was not negligent. Stamp v. Eighty-Sixth Street
Amusement Co. (1916), 159 N. Y. Supp. 683.
It is well established that the owner of a vicious animal is absolutely liable
for any injury done by such animal in the absence of any voluntary act by
the plaintiff which brought on the injury. Card v. Case, 5 C. B. Rep. 622;
Muller v. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195, 29 Am. Rep. 123; Congress etc. Spring Co.
v. Edgar, 99 U. S. 645, 25 Law Ed. 488. Some cases have gone farther and held
that compensation may be recovered from either the owner or the keeper of
a wild animal for injuries done by it. Hayes v. Miller, 150 Ala. 621, I I L. R.
A. (N. S.) 748. But as the court points out in the principal case, in practically all the cases where this rule has been announced the person who
"harbored" the animal took direct charge and control of the animal. However, the Supreme Court of Ontario held in the case of Shaw v. McCreary,
19 Ont. Rep. 39, that even the owner of land upon which the animal was coniined and from which it escaped could be held liable for injuries done by
such animal. In the principal case both parties relied upon the case of Molloy
v. Starin, 191 N. Y. 21, 83 N. E. 588, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 445, 14 Ann. Cases
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.57, and cases there cited. This case held, (CULLEN, C. ]. dissenting,) that a
carrier having possession of a wild animal for transportation is not within
.the rule that the keeper of such an animal is liable for injuries caused by it
irrespective of negligence on his part. See 21 HARV. L. Rev. 441 ; 8 CoL. L.
Rev. 223 and cases there cited. Upon its own peculiar facts that decision was
undoubtedly correct, but as in the principal case the defendant brought the
· wild animals to the theater for his own purposes and then invited the general public to visit the premises the defendant is brought within the rule which
fixes upon one who harbors a wild animal an absolute liability for injuries
suffered as a result of his own acts. For a criticism of the general rule see, ·
CooLtY, ToRTS, (3rd ed.), § 7o6. For a full discussion of the question see
note on page 287 of 97 Am. St. Reps., also note I I I,. R A. (N. S.) 748, and
.article by T. BtvtN, in 22 HARV. L. Rtv. 465-491:
TRusTs-EFrtCT OF DEPOSITS IN TRUST.-A. B. opened an account in a Savings Bank in his own name "in trust for C. D., sister." C. D. was not notified that she had been made cestui que trust of the deposit A. B. died in the
lifetime of C. D. without withdrawing the deposit. Held, at death of A. B.
a trust in the deposit became absolute, and C. D. was entitled thereto. Fiocchi
v. Smith (N. J. Eq. 1916), 97 At!. 283.
The decisions on the question here involved may be classified into three
groups. By the weight of authority the facts given would effect an irrevocable trust. Sayre v. Weil, 94 Ala. 466, IO So. 546; Booth v. Oakla11d Savings
Bank, 122 Calif. 19; Harris Banking Co. v. 1ltliller, 190 Mo. 640; Milholland
v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212; Martin v. Fmik, 75 N. Y. 34; Scott v. Harbeck, 49
N. Y. 292; M eriga11 v. M cGonigle, 205 Pa. St 321; Robinson v. Appleby, 173
N. Y. 626, 66 N. E. 1115; Robinson v. McCarthy, 54 App. Div. 103, 66 N. Y.
Supp. 327. The principal case is typical of the second group in which it.. is
held that the trust is tentative, and revocable. Lat ton v. Van Ness, 184 N. Y.
601, 77 N. E. u90; Cunningham v. Davenport, 147 N. Y. 43, 41 N. E. 412;
In re Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748, 3 M1cH. L. REY. 70, but see Mathias
v. Fowler, 124 Md. 655, 93 At!. 2g8; Ct"tizens National Bank v. McKenna, 168
Mo. App. 254, 153 S. W. 521. In these cases it is usually held that the trust
becomes irrevocable by notice to the cestui, or by the death of the depositor.
'The doctrine of a tentatiYe trust seems to rest on policy rather than logic.
In the third group are found decisions which deny the existence of any trust
on the facts of the principal case. Clark v. Clark, 108 Mass. 522; Stone v.
Bishop, 23 Fed. Cases No. 13482; Jewett v. Shattuck, 124 Mass. 590; Brabrook v. Five Cent Saving Bank, 104 Ma~s. 228; Marcy v. Amazean, 61 N. H.
131, 6o Am. Rep. 320.
WILis-W1TNtSSES SIGNING BEFORE TESTA'tOR.-The deceased, before he
signed his will, requested J to witness it as his will, and J signed his name
to the paper. Thereafter deceased took the paper to R, who witnessed it,
and deceased, in the presence of R, subscribed his name to the document,
but this subscription was never acknowledged to J nor did J ever 'see the
11aper with the deceased's name attached thereto. Held: Under ~NTUCKY
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STATuns, § 4828, declaring that no will shall be valid unless it is in writing,
with the name of the testator subscribed thereto, and, if not wholly written
by the testator, the subscription shall be made or the will acknowledged by
him in the presence of at least two credible witnesses, who shall subscribe
the will with their names in the presence of the testator, the will was not
duly executed, as J's signature could not lend efficacy to the subsequent signature of the deceased, which was never acknowledged to him. Limbach v.
Bolfo (Ky. 1916), 183 S. W. 495.
· Under the statute in question the will might receive legal validity in two
ways: (1) by the testator subscribing it in the presence of two witnesses,
they attesting it by subscribing their names in his presence; (2) by the
testator acknowledging the will in the presence of the two witnesses, they
attesting by their signatures in his presence. All statutes of wills require
that wills be either signed' or subscribed ·by the testator in order to render
them valid and effectual for the disposition of property. · Upon the question
of what constitutes a ~mfficient signing, there are a number of varying
statutes and judicial interpretations thereon. The statute in Kentucky says
that the will must be "subscribed" by the testator. § 4828, KY. STATUTES. In
Soward v. Soward, l Duval (72 Ky.) 126, this was held to mean signed at the
end. The English rule under the STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 29 Car. II, as determined in Lemay11e v. Stanley, (1681) 3 Lev. l, that if the name of the testator
appeared anywhe,re on the instrument, with the inte11tio11 that it sliould be
considered as a signature, it is a sufficient signing, has been followed in a
number of states ,although later changed by the WILI,S Ac::r of I837. See 13.
MICH L. Rr:v. 6I6; 9 MICH L. Rr:v. 342. But in the principal case, the signature of the testator was not placed: at the end of the paper-as required by
the statute and the interpretation thereof-until after J, the first witness, at
testator's request, had attested and subscribed what purported to be the
will of the testator. Therefore, this will did not receive legal validity under
the first of the two ways mentioned supra. But would the fact that one
of the witnesses subscribed the will before the testator signed it affect its
validity? In other words, what is the effect of the witness' signing first,.
provided the attestation of the due execution of the will is done at the same
time or on the same occasion, although subsequent to the signing. In:
O'Brien v. Galagher, 26 Conn. 229; Gibson v. Nelson, I81 Ill. I22, 54 N. E.
901, 72 Am. St. Rep. 254; Swift v. Wiley, l B. Mon. (40 Ky.) n4; Cutler
v. Cutler, I30 N. C. l, 40 S. E. 689, 8g Am. St. Rep. 854, 57 L. R. A. 209;;
Miller v. McNeil, 35 Pa. St. 217, ·78. Am. Dec. 333; Kaufman v. Caughman,.
49 S. C. I59, 27 . S. E. 16, 61 Am. St. Rep. 8o8; Rosser v. Franklfa, 6 Gratt.
(Va.) l, 52 Am: Dec. 97; In Re Hom's Estate, 161 Mich. 20, 125 N. W. 6g6,.
26 L.· R. A. (N. S.) n26, the courts held: the will well executed although
'the witnesses signed before the testator. But in Brooks v. Woodson, 87 Ga.
379, 13 $. E. 712, 14 L. R. A. 16o; Jackson v. Jackso1~, 39 N. Y. 153; Sisters
of Charity v. Kelly, 67 N. Y. 413; Cooper v. Brockett, 3 Curt. 648, 7 Eng. Ecc_
537; Reed v. Watsoit, 27 Ind. 432, it was held that the signing of the names
of the witnesses must be done after the will is signed and attested, there
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being nothing to attest until his signature has been annexed. See 8 MICH.
L. Rr:v. 6go; 5 MICH. L. REV. I47· It is worthy of note, however, in all the
cases which sustain the execution of wills where the witnesses signed before
the testator that the signature of the testator was placed on the instrument
later in th·e presence of all of the witnesses, and all were part of one continuous and entire transaction. But even if it be admitted that the prior signature of the witness does not affect the validity under the circumstances
suggested,- yet there was no valid execution of the will in the principal case,
because the testator not only did not sign the paper in the presence of both
witnesses, but he never acknowledged his signature in their presence, the second way mentioned above to give the w.ill validity. The court said in the
course of its opinion, "The paper which the testator must acknowledge to the
attesting witnesses must, at the time of such acknowledgement, be a completed or finished will so far as the requirements which the statute imposes
upon the testator are concerned. This is not done under our statute until
the testator has subscribed it."
WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION ACT-INJURY ON VESS£!. ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE CoMMERCE.-Defendant is a corporation engaged in operating a steamboat on the Great Lakes between Duluth, Minnesota, and ports in other
states. The Berwind Fuel Company is an employer owning a dock at Duluth.
A was in the employ of the Fuel Company and was engaged in unloading
the cargo of defendant's ship, working in the hold. While so doing he was
injured through the negligence of the defendant. He brought a common law
action for damages. Held, that the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act
applied even though it was not set up in the complaint and although the injury occurred on a ship engaged in interstate commerce. Lindstrom v. Mutual
S.S. Co., (Minn. I9I6), I56 N. W. 66!).
·
Most of the compensation laws now in force in the states are in terms
sufficient to apply·to any injuries received within the states, the only question being as to whether they are superseded by the Federal regulations.
This may be decided under principles already firmly established by decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. As to those cases relating to interstate
commerce which admit of diversity of treatment according to local conditions, the states may act within their respective jurisdictions until Congress
sees fit to act. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. Ed. I5II. When
Congress has acted upon a matter within its power, the state act is superseded. Smith v. Alabama, I24 U. S. 465, 3I L. Ed. 5o8. The present Federal
Employers' Liability Act affects only railroad·s engaged in interstate commerce. Mich. Central Ry. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 57 L. Ed. 4I7. Ships
and boats used by railroads as a part of their railroad systems are within
the Federal act_. The Pawnee, 205 Fed. 333; The Passaic, I90 Fed. 644- But
Congress has not as yet legislated in regard to injuries in interstate commerce by water; the state therefore may. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co.,
(Conn. I9I5), 94 At!. 372. In the case of Chicago & N. W. Railway Co. v.
Gray, 237 U. S. 399, 57 L. Ed. IOI8, it was held that in an action for injuries
received on any railroad in the state, both Federal ~nd State laws will be
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considered, though neither is mentioned in the pleadings, and this case is
followed in the later one of Pipes v. Missouri-Pacific R'y, (Mo. 1916), 184
S. W. 79. Therefore it would seem that the state act will apply to all injuries
received in the state except those occurring on railroads engaged in interstate commerce, and even in that case the state law has an important bearing on the procedure in the trial.
WoRKMEN's CoMP£NSATION-lNJURI£s "ARISING OuT OF" EMPLOYMENT.-

Applicant was a boy employed by respondents, a firm of builders, who, in the
course of his employme!Jt, had to ride a bicycle belonging to his employers
through the streets of London for materials on an average of once a day.
Being injured by a motor bus on one of these trips, he claimed compensation
under the \Vorkman's Compensation Act of 1906. Held, no recovery, as the
injury did not "arise out of' the employment. De1111is v. A. J. White Co.
[1916], 2 K. B. I.
Practically all courts agree that the phrase~ "arising out of" and "in the
course of" the employment are not meant to be synonymous, but they disagree in their interpretations. The English courts, as in the principal case,
agree.now that to "arise out of" the employment the injury must result from
a special danger or risk, and not such as the public it:t general assnme every
day, such as bicycle-riding in the city thoroughfares, even though at the employer's command, and on his business. In this country the courts are divided, Michigan holding, with the minority, to the strict English rule. Hopkins v. Michigan S11gar Co., 184 Mich. 87; ISO N. W. 325. Minnesota and
New Jersey, on the other hand, together with Massachusetts, agree that the
phrases are not synonymous, but hold that the injury "arises out of" the employment' if the accident causing the injury arises out of work or business
being done for the master, either hy direct or implied authority. State, e:e
rel-Duluth Brewing Co. v. District Court, 129 Minnesota, 176, 151 N. W. 912;
In re Sunditie, 218 Massachusetts, I, 105 N. E. 433; Httlley v. Moosbrngger,
88 N. J. L. 161, 93 Atl. 79. In the last case the New Jersey court allowed
compensation where the deceased was killed in the course of his employment
by dodging a playful attack of a fellow employee. In the Washington statute
this difficulty is partly obviated hy providing .for compensation only in case
of injury while engaged in an "extra-ha1.ardous" occupation, which, however,
leaves a great discretion still to the court.
'

